Introduction: Capability and Intent

• In the decade between the 9/11 attacks and 2011, the data flow from intelligence gathered remotely by piloted drones and other surveillance technologies rose by 1,600% (Shanker & Richtel, 2011).

• The increased availability of digital data and information resources, along with a plethora of improved analytical tools and collection platforms, provide a modern intelligence analyst with abundant resources for threat assessment.

• The onus of transforming raw data and information into knowledge or intelligence products relies on the skills and abilities of intelligence analysts, but analysts’ training currently does not include information processing or data analysis.
Problem Statement & Motivation

This study focuses specifically on the redefined role of the analyst by examining the system of tactical intelligence.

The analysis uses systems design tools to:

- Examine and model the design of military operations
- Define the analyst’s required capability in context of tactical operations
- Explore, revise, and assess components of intelligence competency
- Assess the relative costs of competency gaps
- Recommend improvements
Modular Force Structure:

- affords the flexibility to configure deployed forces to match the operational requirements based on threat and environment
- empowers each unit to act as a functional element contributing to the Army’s overall strategic capability.

Nested Operations:

- unify the military efforts of geographically distanced and/or functionally disparate units
- enable decision-makers at each level to examine their operations in terms of the broader objectives they support
- enable effective coordination of processes without tight coupling of organizational structures

Strategy & Operational Art

- Strategy
  - National Strategic Objectives
  - Theater Strategic Objectives

- Operational Art
  - Operational-Level Objectives
  - Tactical Objectives

Unified Action

Relationship between Strategy and Operational Art (JP 3-0)

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“Army modular forces place a high premium on the ability of BCT intelligence (S-2) elements to collect, rapidly exploit and fuse all sources of information into actionable intelligence in response to rapidly changing circumstances and commanders’ operational needs. This has driven significant MI growth at the BCT and battalion levels, establishment of reinforcing MI units within new battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSB), major expansion of Army human intelligence (HUMINT) forces, rebalancing of MI skills across active and reserve components, and new intelligence readiness programs…”

_institute of land warfare, 2007_

_levels of intelligence, adapted from JP 3-0_
Structure of Tactical Unit Staff

Battalion Decomposition

Staff Element

Coordinating Staff

Personnel Officer (S1)
Intelligence Officer (S2)
Operations Officer (S3)
Logistics Officer (S4)
Signal Officer (S6)

Special Staff

Executive Officer (XO)

Battalion Commander (BN CDR)

Subordinate Units

Company CDR

Typical Battalion Decomposition (adapted from ATTP 5-01, FM 6-0, and DA PAM 10-1)

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1. Receipt of Mission
2. Mission Analysis
3. Course of Action (COA) Development
4. COA Analysis (War Game)
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Orders Production

Field Manual 101-5. Figure 5-1. The military decision-making process
Structure Driving Likelihood of Success

### Table: Range Category for Capacity Utilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Prediction Level and Base Rate \ p(\text{success})</th>
<th>Mission Success?</th>
<th>\text{Effect on Likelihood of Success}</th>
<th>\text{Range Category for Capacity Utilization}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\text{IDEAL}</td>
<td>\text{OVERWORKED}</td>
<td>\text{UNDERWORKED}</td>
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<tr>
<td>\text{Average deduction} = 0</td>
<td>@ avg deduction</td>
<td>@ max deduction = .15</td>
<td>@ max deduction = .10</td>
</tr>
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<td>Perfect \ p = 1.0</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong \ 1.0 &gt; p &gt; .7</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair \ .7 &gt; p &gt; .6</td>
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<td>.65</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak \ p = 0.5</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
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</table>

Model Behavior: Extreme Values for Likelihood of Success

Mission Performance When Likelihood of Success Is 100%:
- Tasks in Higher Level Objective
- Missions to Do
- Missions in Progress
- Missions to Rework

Mission Performance When Likelihood of Success Is 0%:
- Tasks in Higher Level Objective
- Missions to Do
- Missions in Progress
- Missions to Rework

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Simulations Using Test Input Generator
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation in Unit Capacity</th>
<th>Test Input Used</th>
<th>Obj Achieved?</th>
<th>Time to Complete Obj</th>
<th>Tasks Required to Achieve Obj</th>
<th>Total Effort</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Avg Missions to Do</th>
<th>Avg Missions In Progress</th>
<th>Avg Likelihood of Success</th>
<th>Avg Relative Prediction of Threat</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>0.887</td>
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<td>1068</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>833</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>784</td>
<td>966</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.828</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>over 548</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0.656</td>
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<td>over 548</td>
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<td>338</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0.663</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>785</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0.884</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>1016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noise</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.898</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Effects of Mission Complexity and Imperfect Information

In the model, mission complexity defines the number of potential intel gaps for a mission, and changing parameters within the intelligence cycle to include representations for imperfect information and increasing mission complexity provide insight into how these conditions affect the unit’s performance.

Real Percentage Change from 1980

### Nature of Intelligence Analysis

- No real ratio of success to failure
- No true gauge of uncertainty level

### Organizational Design

- Cultural disparity between analysts and operators
- Experience differentials
- Potential conflicts of interests because of incentive structure

---

### Tasks in MDMP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks in MDMP</th>
<th>CDR</th>
<th>XO</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S4</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S6</th>
<th>Operators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert key staff and participants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather tools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update running estimates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Initial Assessment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue the initial Warning Order (WARNORD)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze higher HQ plan or order.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perform initial IPB.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review available assets.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine constraints.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify critical facts and develop assumptions.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Begin composite risk management.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop initial CCOs and EFOs.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dev initial R&amp;S synchronization tools.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop initial R&amp;S plan.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Update plan for use of available time.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop initial themes and messages.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop proposed mission statement.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop proposed mission statement.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present the mission analysis briefing.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and issue initial cdr’s intent.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev and issue initial planning guidance.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev and issue initial planning guidance.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue a warning order (WARNORD).</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess relative combat power.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generate options.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Array forces.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a broad concept.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assign headquarters.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare COA statements and sketches.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct COA briefing.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select or modify COAs for continued analysis.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gather the tools.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>List all friendly forces.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>List assumptions.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>List known critical events and decision points.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select the war-gaming method.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select a technique to record and display results.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-game the operation and assess the results.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct advantages and disadvantages analysis.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compare COAs.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct a COA decision briefing.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander selects COA.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander issues the final planning guidance.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue Warning Order (WARNORD #3).</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver/brief order to subordinate unit.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### DSM, People to People Exchanges

---

**Methodology informed by:**
Core Competencies in Tactical Intelligence

Intelligence Methodology
- planning and direction
- collection
- processing and exploitation
- analysis and production
- dissemination and integration
- evaluation and feedback

Integration
- operations doctrine
- unit-specific mission, tactics, and standard operating procedures (SOP)
- unit-level decision processes

MIT
dsm
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
System Design and Management

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Modern Challenges in the Intel Cycle

- Increased due to the nature of threat, operational environment, and integrated composition of Army units
- Generate more information
- Collection results = collection tasks * information available/task
- Takes more time due to the increase in collection results
- Requires more knowledge in data validation and processing
- Requires more skill with automated tools
- Requires more fusion due to increased variety of available intelligence resources
- Requires more integration due to integrated composition of Army units
Update to Core Competencies

Enduring

• Intelligence Methodology
  – planning and direction
  – collection
  – processing and exploitation
  – analysis and production
  – dissemination and integration
  – evaluation and feedback

• Integration
  – operations doctrine
  – unit-specific mission, tactics, and standard operating procedures (SOP)
  – unit-level decision processes

Newly Identified

• Communication
  – Clarity
  – Cohesion
  – Delivery

• Information Processing:
  – Data building
  – Data mining
  – Data validation
  – Information network mapping
  – Interpretation
  – Critique
Multi-Domain Mapping Matrix for Analysts’ Core Competencies

Methodology:

• Examined analysts’ competencies across holistic identity on a battalion staff:
  • Intelligence Officer (ADRP 2-0, ATP 2-01, ADP 2-01.3, TC 2-33.4)
  • Staff Member (ATTP 5-01)
  • Leader (FM 6-22)

• Specifications also include the lists of intelligence core competencies, published in January 2014 as part of the most recent Army Intelligence Training Strategy (Maher & Poon, 1996).

In total, the functional components of analysts’ competencies were assessed across 132 competencies specified by the Army.
Multi-Domain Mapping Matrix for Analysts’ Core Competencies

- Functional Components of Competency Requirements
- Specifications for Competency Requirements

- Critical Task List

- Data Validation Interpretation (logical/quanititative reasoning, significant relationships)
- Update running estimates
- Dev and issue initial planning guidance
- Conduct Intelligence Support to Targeting
- Integrate Intelligence with the other Army Warfighting Functions
- Create initial planning requirements tools
- List assumptions.
- Gather tools
- Allow query functions for decision making, as well as operational and analytical support.
# Enabled Intelligence Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Information Processing</th>
<th>Intel Doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Original DSM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Direction</td>
<td>Processing &amp; Exploitation</td>
<td>Data Collection and Validation</td>
<td>Data Building and Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Doctrine</td>
<td>Planning and Collection</td>
<td>Data Mining</td>
<td>Delivery (unit's communication network/protocols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Building</td>
<td>Clarity/Articulation (in analysis)</td>
<td>Interpretation (logical/quantitative reasoning)</td>
<td>Critique (sources of uncertainty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modified DSM</strong></td>
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<td>2 Processing and Analysis</td>
<td>B Information Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Decision Making</td>
<td>C Unit-Specific Context</td>
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Investing in Adaptive Capabilities

Information systems, hardware and software suites, and analytics packages will always have to evolve with improvements in technology: our people should have foundational skills that enable seamless integration of new platforms.

- Without competency in information processing:
  - analysts cannot leverage supporting tools to their fullest potential
  - technology may contribute to a workload rather than reducing it

- Building competency across the fundamentals of information processing provides enduring knowledge that can deliver value through a broad range of technological dependence as well as in an analog environment.

- Even the best algorithms and user interfaces cannot enhance intel capabilities if end users do not understand the underlying concepts and processes involved.
Without Change, Analysts’ Capability Erodes

To meet mission demands in a time-constrained environment, analysts must find faster and more efficient ways to deliver more intelligence products.

- rely on templates
- use outdated assessments
- outsource some of their workload (intelligence reach)

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**Analyst Competency**

![Analyst Competency Diagram]

**Model adapted from and informed by:**
The effect of decreased competency across the organization negatively affects the warfighter two-fold:

- increasingly higher levels of the organization lack the requisite capabilities to effectively perform intelligence functions
- effects of intelligence reach partners’ re-allocating resources to the immediate mission means that they dedicate less of their capacities toward preparing the warfighter for the future combat

### Intelligence Spending Overview

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Sources: DNI & DOD press release.

Notes: Constant figures are deflated using the GDP index. Table 5-1 of DOD’s National Defense Budget Estimate for FY2014, available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/dobudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf, provides a GDP price index with 2014 as the base year. Figures for 2013 are as requested by the President, without adjustment for sequestration.
Concluding Thoughts

The future of the tactical intelligence analyst requires change initiation now.

The cohesive roles and efforts of the Military Intelligence Corps, unit, and analyst provide the foundation of the tactical analyst’s competencies.

- **The Military Intelligence Corps** — must provide people with the requisite capabilities to analyze intelligence.
- **The unit** — must provide the context for intelligence application through mentorship, education, training, and experience.
- **The analyst** — must maintain and evolve proficiencies as information technology and operational requirements change.

Analysts’ competencies must also sufficiently equip the analyst to overcome organizational design problems.
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ADRP 6-0. (2012). ADRP 6-0: Mission Command. Headquarters, Department of the Army.


References cont’d


